The proprioceptive sense informs us about the position of our own limbs in relation to one another and to the space around us. Its sensations come from the muscles and tendons and are not localized. The proprioceptive and tactile sensations combine to constitute the haptic. Proprioceptive feedback is an important developmental component in the sense of agency.
In Virtual Reality, Howard Rheingold describes some of the dislocations of self experienced in VR, for example of seeing himself from a different point of view such that his connection with his physical body seemed severed. He could see his own body as someone else. (the new identifications and reconfigured body image which can occur after this step are often referred to, in a quasi-religious langage, as "conversion experiences." )
Rheingold also describes the experience of molecular manipulations in which the resistances and attractions of chemical forces are felt in relation to his own body. (see personal space) The design of telepresent technologies addresses the combination of machine and human. The machine is perfected along a bodily vector, molded to the perceptions and actions of humans.
Katherine Richards (?) speaks of "spectral bodies" where proprioceptive coherence is broken. This sensory dissonance in the body image is often accompanied by nausea. (see the story of Madame I in Deny and Camus)
There is an interesting and somewhat similar discussion of orientation and space in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, in the chapter on space. Merleau-Ponty recounts psychological experiments in which the subject wears a pair of glasses which inverts the normal image. Since the eye performs a similar optic inversion, one can think of these glasses as giving the optic nerve an uninverted image. Be this as it may, the experiment recounts the different stages of adaptation to the sensory input as well as the readaptation once the glasses are taken off. "What counts for the orientation of the spectacle is not my body as it in fact is, as a thing in objective space, but as a system of possible actions, a virtual body with its phenomenal " place" defined by its task and situation. My body is wherever there is something to be done." (Phenomenology of Perception, p.250)
In another example, Merleau-Ponty describes a prosthetic or instrumentally mediated modification of perception through the blind man's cane, whose point"has become an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius of touch, and providing a parallel to sight." (Phenomenology of Perception, p.245)
See also perspective.