For Hegel, the "interior" in architecture is a metaphor for mental inwardness.
In the early phase of antique art, the pyramid's clearly recognizable and completely detached exterior form, with its suppression of interior space and entry, serves to illustrate the desire to suppress space. Even when space was more practically necessary than in the tomb, the Egyptians were artistically reluctant to create it. Even vast spaces, such as Karnak, were filled with individual columns, and openings in the exterior walls were kept to the barest minimum.
In the second, Greek phase of antique architecture, some optical synopsis and sense of depth is allowed, but still the chief responsibility of architecture is the limitation of space. The Greek columnar house and temple show recognitions of three-dimensionality in shadow and space. (see haptic / optic )
In late Roman churches (such as the pantheon) vast interior spaces were developed, in which free space was individualized, treated as a cubic material and captured in clear dimensions. Because of the constant alteration of depth (in the curved form) the Pantheon, according to Riegl, demands a much higher degree of subjective consciousness on the part of the beholder.
"Elaborating upon the Hegelian example, Karl Schnaase described, in the development of medieval architecture, a conflict between two opposed architectural conceptions: the concept of a building as an object, as constructed for the sake of its exterior, and as constructed to create an interior space. The temple architecture of antiquity was designed to be seen primarily from outside, in contrast to the church which was designed as an interior space in which the community gathers. In the development of Christian church building, architectural membrification is adjusted to bring out the sense of space rather than to create a sense of solidity, and the concern for the interior gradually dominates the form, so that the exterior is permeated by the forms of the interior." (Podro, The Critical Historians of Art, p.34) In his descriptions of the interior columns of a basilican church, Schnaase describes them as joined in a higher unity, which for him is the "spiritual unity" of perspective.
For Henri Bergson, the notion of interior and exterior arises from the distinction between my body and other bodies. In his rejction of dualism, Bergson identifies this distinction with that between part and whole. Bergson starts with the whole, that is, the material world in general, and gradually cuts out within a center of action which I call my body to distinguish it from all others.
Deleuze and Guattari try to reject the notion of interior by describing it as only the multileveled in folding of an aleatory outside, with which the infolding remains in contact. (Massumi, p.80)
Ernesto Laclau develops a theory of social antagonism, which is the "limit of all objectivity. This should be understood in its most literal sense: as the assertion that antagonism does not have an objective meaning, but is that which prevents the constitution of objectivity itself. The Hegelian conception of contradiction subsumed within it both social antagonisms and the processes of natural change. This was made possible insofar as contradiction was conceived as an internal moment of the concept; the rationality of the real was the rationality of the system, with any "outside" excluded by definition. In our conception of antagonism, on the other hand, we are faced with a "constitutive outside." It is an "outside" which blocks the identity of the "inside: (and is, nonetheless, the prerequisite for its constitution at the same time). With antagonism, denial does not originate from the "inside" of identity itself but, in its most radical form, from outside. (from Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections of the Revolution of our Time, quoted in Rasch and Wolfe, "introduction" to Observing Complexity.)
For Deleuze and Guattari, the nomad is the "outsider." Nomadic thought is "outside" thought (an expression they borrow from Blanchot) Nomadic science is "minor science" which is itinerant, ambulant, and follows flows in vectorial fields accross which singularities are scattered like so many "accidents." (p372)